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Abstract
Are unequal societies more migratory? The position of this paper is: not 
necessarily, it depends on the type of inequality. By proposing horizontal 
and vertical inequality between and within ethnic groups as separate drivers 
of migration, we hypothesize that heightened emigration is a consequence 
of vertical inequality and feelings of individual relative deprivation, whereas 
people facing horizontal inequality feel rather strongly about collective rela-
tive deprivation, making non-migration more likely. Consequently, inequality 
and relative deprivation can work in both directions, i.e. either as a driver or 
a barrier of migration, depending on whether social comparisons are made 
within or between ethnic groups. Analysis of emigrant stocks for a large set 
of developed and developing countries show that countries with higher 
levels of horizontal inequality across ethnic groups show a lower emigration 
propensity whereas vertical within-group inequality seems rather a reason 
for people moving abroad. The analysis also shows that the relative size of 
these behavioural responses depends on people’s educational levels which 
largely reflect their exit opportunities. 
Keywords: international migration, inequality, relative deprivation 
1. Introduction
This paper explores the relationship between economic inequality and 
international migration. I argue that the role of inequality in ‘driving’ 
emigration is less straightforward than the existing literature suggests. By 
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diffferent ways of how people may perceive the unequal societies they are 
living in, I try to add an important new perspective to the analysis of the 
inequality-migration nexus, which thus far only looks at the role of vertical 
inequality as a potential driver of migration (Stark 2006). 
The quantitative literature on the determinants of international migra-
tion largely confĳirms the assumption that migration decisions of individuals 
and households are mainly responsive to socio-economic factors, and can 
thus be considered as relevant drivers on aggregated emigration f lows. 
However, knowledge about the role of socio-economic inequality structures 
and how they shape emigration flows is still very limited. One aspect that 
seems crucial in generating a better understanding about the drivers of 
emigration f lows is the question of how economic, social, and political 
inequality and respective feelings of relative deprivation trigger emigration 
intentions (Czaika and de Haas 2012). For instance, feelings of collective 
relative deprivation as a consequence of inequality and social comparisons 
across social or ethnic groups can play a decisive role. Such feelings about 
the state of the ‘collective’ may lead to quite diffferent behavioural responses 
than feelings of personal relative deprivation that are rather nurtured by a 
person’s own relative position within a larger (reference) group or society 
(Czaika 2012, Czaika and de Haas 2012). 
Some migration scholars have investigated the role of absolute and 
relative deprivation of particular groups in origin communities to explain 
people’s decisions to, or not to, migrate. Hereby, the new economics of 
labour migration (NELM) has argued that feelings of relative deprivation 
are a major driver of migration, acknowledging that not only a person’s own 
(absolute) income is relevant in the decision to migrate, but also the relative 
income of others (Stark 1984; Stark &Taylor 1991; Stark & Yitzhaki 1988). This 
assumption is confĳirmed by research in social psychology, which asserts 
that people not only assess their personal status and outcomes according 
to an objective and absolute standard, but also according to the situation of 
relevant others. This implies that people may migrate not only to increase 
their income in absolute terms, but more in general, to improve their relative 
position with respect to others in their ‘reference group’. 
Consequently, it has been argued that migration propensities are posi-
tively associated with inequality in the origin societies, and micro-level 
evidence has largely confĳirmed the hypothesis that relative deprivation in 
sending communities increases emigration tendencies (Stark & Taylor 1989, 
1991; Bhandari 2004; Quinn 2006). Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004) provide 
some evidence for the hypothesis that countries with a more unequal 
income distribution tend to have higher migration propensities. Stark (2006) 
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has provided a conceptual framework for this structural relationship by 
arguing that relative deprivation of individuals or households is the ‘missing 
link’ between economic inequality and emigration. He argues that a higher 
degree of economic inequality within a country increases feelings of relative 
deprivation, which ceteris paribus increases people’s emigration propensity, 
and thus, higher emigration rates. We may therefore assume that relative 
deprivation is conducive to emigration, although it seems neither necessary, 
nor sufffĳ icient, for inducing migration (Czaika and de Haas 2012). 
However, almost all of these studies only focus on vertical inequality, 
i.e. within-group inequality among individuals of the same social entity, 
whereas horizontal (between-group) inequalities are largely ignored (Stew-
art 2008); at least as a causal factor of migration. The present study therefore 
analyses the inequality-migration nexus more in detail by contrasting 
feelings of individual relative deprivation (IRD) and collective relative dep-
rivation (CRD) as separate drivers (or barriers) of migration. Acknowledging 
that people may simultaneously perceive multiple social identities, I will 
only focus on ethnicity as the distinct marker of social identity. The central 
hypothesis is the following: horizontal inequality between ethnic groups 
has a fundamentally diffferent efffect on the overall emigration propensity 
of a country than vertical inequality within ethnic groups. 
In the next section I substantiate this hypothesis by proposing the concept of 
collective (i.e. group-based) relative deprivation as one way to operational-
ize economic horizontal inequality in contrast to individual (within-group) 
relative deprivation as a measure for vertical inequality. Section 3 will 
then provide some preliminary evidence on the size and direction of these 
hypothesised associations between (horizontal and vertical) inequality 
emigration flows. The fĳ inal section summarises and concludes.
2. Inequality, relative deprivation and migration
2.1. Inequality and relative deprivation
Most research on the inequality-migration nexus tends to focus on people’s 
individual (and sometimes household) income and its unequal distribu-
tion within a community or country (e.g. Czaika and de Haas 2012, Stark 
2006). However, this focus on vertical inequality among individuals of the 
same reference group ignores the group dimension as a vital dimension 
of human well-being and of social coherence (Stewart 2002, Østby 2011). 
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Sen (1992) argues that general analyses of inequality should focus more 
on inter-group variations instead of focusing on only inter-personal (i.e. 
vertical) inequalities.
Migration scholars have attempted to explore the role of income inequal-
ity in origin countries in determining individual propensities to migrate. 
NELM has identifĳ ied relative deprivation as one of the main motivators 
for migration. NELM scholars argue that the relative deprivation approach 
overcomes an important shortcoming of the welfare function approach 
by making marginal utility of income a function not only of people’s own 
income, but also on the income of others (Stark, 1984; Stark & Yitzhaki, 1988; 
Stark & Taylor, 1991). They argue basically that the efffect of income on utility 
and well-being is not independent from broader changes in socio-economic 
settings. For instance, the importance of a set increase in income to a person 
depends on his or her position in the income distribution (Stark & Yitzhaki, 
1988; Stark & Taylor, 1991; Massey et al., 1993; Stark et al., 2009). 
This broadened perspective on the role of socio-economic factors in 
migration decision-making implies that people and entire households may 
not only migrate to improve their own absolute income, but also to increase 
their income relative to other individuals or households in their reference 
group. Stark, in particular, has argued that migration is a consequence of 
economic inequality in the origin societies (e.g. Stark 2006). A number of 
micro-level empirical tests have confĳirmed the hypothesis that feelings of 
individual relative deprivation as a correlate of vertical inequality increase 
migration propensities in sending communities (Stark & Taylor (1989, 1991) 
and Quinn (2006) for the Mexico-US case; Bhandari (2004) for Nepal; and 
Czaika (2012) for India).1 Apart from the fact that evidence on the role of 
vertical inequality (within groups, communities or even countries) is still 
scarce, IRD within the same social or ethnic group is only likely to play 
a signifĳ icant role in explaining migration if the returns on migration are 
high and ‘reference group substitution’ unlikely, i.e. people rather compare 
with peers at home than those abroad (Stark & Taylor, 1991; Czaika & de 
Haas 2012).2 
To date, the migration literature has focused mainly on relative depriva-
tion as a consequence of inter-personal comparisons within a community, 
region or sometimes even a country. This raises the crucial question about 
the appropriate reference point for such social comparisons. Sub-national 
entities with (ideally) clear markers of social boundaries such as ethnic 
groups seem a relevant reference category for both intra- and inter-group 
comparisons (Czaika 2012). However, this claim for studying the role of intra- 
and inter-group inequality on migration comes with some methodological 
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challenges. First, group identities are often self-chosen, multiple, and fluent. 
Thus, boundaries between groups are rarely clear cut and usually blurred, 
which makes categorization of social groups sometimes arbitrary.3 And 
second, even if a robust categorisation of social groups has been identifĳ ied, 
the operationalisation and measurability of group identifĳ ication seems an-
other challenge. Taifel (1982) fĳ inds that a certain level of group identifĳication 
requires the awareness and appreciation of membership including at least 
some emotional investment into group membership. The extent to which 
individuals or households identify themselves with a social or ethnic group 
they ‘offfĳ icially’ belong to however, is a priori unclear. Beyond this, group 
identifĳ ication is sometimes endogenous to group inequality. When people 
perceive inter-group inequality, the identifĳ ication with their group may be 
strengthened. This reinforces perceptions of collective relative deprivation, 
particularly if others categorise and assign them into groups and thereby 
consolidate horizontal inequality (Stewart et al. 2005). Consequently, group 
identifĳ ication can often be reinforced by cultural, economic and political 
diffferentials, which makes its operationalisation even more complex (Gurr 
1993).
In societies where economic, social and/or political inequalities coincide 
with ethnic cleavages, group identifĳ ication can be a mobilizing agent (Stew-
art 2002). This hypothesis has predominantly been explored in research 
on horizontal inequality and conflict (see Cederman et al 2011, Østby 2011, 
Stewart 2008). Gurr (1993) argues that ethnic identities and grievances 
may mutually reinforce each other: horizontal inequalities increase the 
level of group grievances as well as the perception of a common identity. 
At the same time, the strength of group identity does influence both group 
grievances and the potential for (political) mobilization.
Groups whose members have been systematically restrained from equal 
access to economic resources often develop a strong sense of collective griev-
ances. Interestingly, privileged groups may also experience a similar type 
of collective grief due to their fear of losing their privileges. For instance, if 
relatively deprived groups gain political power and demand redistribution of 
economic or other resources, inter-group inequality is potentially associated 
with inter-group transfers from richer to poorer groups. Richer groups may 
perceive these transfers as too large and it may increase their level of col-
lective grievances (Østby 2011). Accordingly, group-based collective action 
and political mobilization is usually not only initiated by relatively deprived 
groups but also by the more advantaged groups. Thus, groups with feelings 
of inferiority or superiority are potentially causing inter-group grievances, 
tensions and potentially even conflicts (Horowitz 1985). Stewart (2008) 
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reminds us that it is often not only the relatively deprived groups whose 
resentments trigger group-based collective (political) action. She notes that 
it is also the relatively privileged who may attack the underprivileged (or the 
state) as a reaction to what they may perceive as unfair redistribution, or 
simply out of fear that the relatively deprived may demand more resources 
and gain political influence. 
It is clear though that collective grievance does not necessarily lead to 
collective action. Only when resources, organisation and opportunities 
are available along with collective feelings of relative deprivation that 
create strong group identifĳ ication and cohesion, can people be mobilized 
for collective actions including protest and rebellion (Tilly, 1978). Brewer 
(1991) argues that the willingness of people to make sacrifĳ ices for group 
action is more linked to feelings of collective rather than individual relative 
deprivation. Thus, improving the situation of the own group may be a more 
powerful motivation to participate in collective actions than improvement 
of the individual’s condition. Consequently, and using Hirschman’s (1970) 
terminology, horizontal inequality may make the ‘voice’ option more at-
tractive than ‘exit’.
Furthermore, inter-personal comparisons with others outside the 
boundaries of the own social group may only be a source for feelings of 
individual relative deprivation and aspirations if these boundaries are 
perceived as permeable (Ellemers et al 1990). We may assume that ethnic 
boundaries are rather impervious, and thus, create a relatively high degree 
of group identifĳ ication and loyalty. This implies that due to the fact that 
members of ethnic groups can hardly change their ethnic identity, social 
comparisons beyond their ethnic group are rather group-based, and thus, 
creating feelings of collective instead of personal relative deprivation. 
2.2. Personal versus collective relative deprivation 
Relative deprivation theory (RDT) studies the relationship between adverse 
outcomes from social comparisons and subsequent perceptions, feelings 
and behaviours (Runciman, 1966; Walker and Pettigrew 1984; Kawakami 
and Dion 1993). An unresolved question of RDT remains in specifying, a 
priori, who compares with whom? A simple social-psychological heuristic 
suggests that individuals tend to compare with ‘similar others’ (Brown 
2000, Walker & Smith 2000). The notion of similar others implies though 
that people can assess their individual position both within their ethnic 
group as well as the overall standing of their entire group with respect to 
other ethnic groups. Thus, the extent to which social comparisons generate 
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diffferent types of feelings of relative deprivation depends on the situation 
of peers either within or beyond the own ethnic group.
Runciman (1966) distinguishes two types of relative deprivation that are 
the result of either intra-group or inter-group comparisons. Personal relative 
deprivation refers to one’s own position in relation to other members within 
the same social group. On the other hand, collective relative deprivation 
relates to the status of people’s own ethnic group compared to other ethnic 
groups in a society. Thus, based on both inter-personal and inter-group 
comparisons, within-group and between-group inequality creates feelings 
of relative deprivation and as a consequence, discontent and frustration, 
but also aspirations for individual or collective change.
In the following, I argue that inter-personal comparisons within ethnic 
groups create feelings of IRD. On the contrary, a poor relative standing 
of an ethnic group with regard to other ethnic groups creates feelings of 
group-based CRD for all group members. As a consequence, we may roughly 
distinguish four groups of people: those simultaneously perceiving either 
relatively high (or low) levels of IRD and CRD, and those with rather ‘mixed’ 
feelings by simultaneously perceiving low (or high) IRD in combination 
with high (or low) CRD (see Pettigrew et al. 2008). Thus, a person may 
feel relatively deprived within the ethnic group, but at the same time, the 
respective ethnic group may be relatively better-offf compared to other 
groups. Some people may even perceive ‘double relative deprivation’ due to 
a relatively low standing within their ethnic group and the poor status of 
the entire ethnic group. In India, for instance, both IRD and CRD are found 
to be distinct factors in the migration decision-making of individuals and 
households (Czaika 2012).
2.3. Relative deprivation versus absolute deprivation
People who usually have the strongest perceptions of (individual or collec-
tive) relative deprivation are not the poorest and most destitute (Kawakimi 
and Dion 1993). Therefore, it is rather feelings of relative and not absolute 
deprivation that are expected to be driving forces of behavioural responses. 
Some scholars argue that while absolute poverty may lead to apathy and 
inactivity, comparisons with those who do better may inspire for radical 
action, and sometimes even violence (Østby 2008).
For instance, Runciman’s (1966) study on the causes of social unrest has 
already shown that people participating in insurgencies are rarely those 
most deprived. Some migration literature makes similar claims about the 
fact that it is usually not the poorest in a society who consider or can affford 
emigration as a way out of poverty (e.g. de Haas 2010). Obviously, scarcity 
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of economic resources and deprivation of other substantive freedoms and 
capabilities constraints people from moving, particularly internationally. 
Lack of human capabilities seem to be a signifĳicant constraint for migration 
as is indicated in many less developed countries by comparatively low 
emigration rates. For Burkina Faso, for instance, Wouterse (2008) shows 
that long-distance international migration, which generally involves high 
costs and risks, is mainly only accessible for relatively wealthy households. 
Thus, we may generally assume that the more a person perceives any form 
of relative deprivation, the higher is her propensity to migrate. However, 
this only holds if absolute deprivation and other resource constraints do not 
create barriers to the individual’s ability to migrate. Therefore, absence of 
absolute deprivation seems to be a necessary, but not sufffĳ icient condition 
for any resource-intensive behaviour such as migration. Perceptions of a 
fundamental ‘aspiration gap’, i.e. the discrepancy between one’s aspired po-
sition and the status quo, explain to a large extent discontentment and some 
form of individual or collective action (Brown 2000, Czaika and Vothknecht 
2012). Interestingly, discontent as a consequence of a substantial aspiration 
gap is not only prevalent among poorer people, but also, and sometimes even 
more so, among more privileged people, which makes them more capable 
and also more willing for proactive behaviour. 
What behavioural actions are likely to follow from these diffferent 
types of relative deprivations? Wright (2001) argues that members of a 
disadvantaged group may choose collective action, which is intended 
to improve the circumstances and conditions of the entire social group. 
Alternatively, relatively deprived members of a (disadvantaged) group may 
also try to improve their personal situation by taking individual action. In 
this case, ‘an individual focuses on one’s personal identity and acts in ways 
that distance oneself from the disadvantaged in-group, while attempting 
to acquire a more advantaged position’(Wright 2001, p. 411). This implies 
that individual relative deprivation induces individual mobility, whereas 
collective relative deprivation rather triggers actions for broader social 
change. By referring to Hirschman’s (1970) distinction of ‘exit and voice’ as 
two possible behavioural options, we may re-interpret these as alternative 
responses to feelings of individual and collective discontent.4 People who 
feel personally deprived are more likely to prefer individual strategies to 
change individual circumstances (Walker and Pettigrew, 1984; Walker 
and Mann, 1987), whereas people who believe that the group they belong 
to and identify with is relatively deprived are likely to participate more 
frequently and actively in collective action to pursue broader structural 
change. Therefore, I subsequently argue that emigration (i.e. the exit option) 
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is a consequence of IRD, whereas people who feel strongly about collective 
relative deprivation are likely to choose non-migration (i.e. voice). Conse-
quently, inequality and relative deprivation can work in both directions, i.e. 
either as a driver or as a barrier of migration, depending on whether social 
comparisons are made within or between ethnic groups. The assumed 
implication is that feelings of personal relative deprivation are more likely 
to create aspirations for migration, whereas decisions not to migrate and 
be loyal to one’s own ethnic group may be the consequence of horizontal 
inequality and associated feelings of collective relative deprivation. Thus, 
we can formulate the following two hypotheses by specifying vertical and 
horizontal inequality as separate determinants of migration.
Hypothesis 1: Vertical inequality as driver of migration
Endowment with sufffĳ icient economic, social and human capital enables 
individuals and households to generate and realise their desire to migrate. 
This desire for migration is based on factors that create aspirations to mi-
grate in order to signifĳ icantly change one’s ‘life qualities’. Although factors 
that generate migration aspirations are likely to be manifold, we can argue 
that intra-group inequality and comparison among individuals belonging to 
the same ethnic group is a driving factor for generating individual relative 
deprivation (IRD), which is expected to trigger people’s aspirations for 
migration (Hypothesis 1a).
We may further hypothesise that emigration propensities vary by 
people’s capabilities for migration, which are often represented by their 
respective educational background or skills. Education can initiate and 
spur migration. Highly educated people have greater capabilities and access 
to technology and information enabling them to explore job and general 
livelihood opportunities in other countries. Educated migrants are also 
likely to have a greater capacity to adapt in host societies. Thus, although 
high skilled migrants have generally higher emigration propensities, they 
are less likely to sufffer, and therefore respond less to vertical within-group 
inequality, making IRD a relatively strong driver of migration for lower 
skilled migrants (Hypothesis 1b).5
Hypothesis 2: Horizontal inequality as barrier of migration
Hirschman (1970) argues that loyalty is a major condition for behavioural 
responses such as protest or rebellion (i.e. the ‘voice option’), which aim 
for broader societal changes that go beyond individual concerns. Being 
loyal to people who are part of, and identify with the same social group 
implies a relatively strong (emotional) commitment that often overrides 
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individualistic interest (Pfafff & Kim, 2003; North 1981). Therefore, without 
having a strong loyalty to a social (or ethnic) group, individuals without 
efffective constraints on exiting are more likely to leave. Thus, the likeli-
hood of choosing the ‘voice’ option, i.e. non-emigration, increases with the 
degree of group identifĳ ication and loyalty (Hirschman 1970).6 Consequently, 
we can hypothesise that horizontal (inter-group) inequality that induces 
feelings of collective relative deprivation (CRD) increases the degree of 
group identifĳ ication and loyalty, and lowers people’s aspirations and inten-
tions for migration (Hypothesis 2a). Finally, we may hypothesise that lower 
skilled migrants respond more strongly to horizontal inequality than more 
privileged and often better educated people for whom social boundaries are 
more permeable. Therefore, we should expect that low-skill emigration has 
a relatively strong negative association with horizontal inequality compared 
to the emigration of higher skilled people (Hypothesis 2b). 
3. Empirical Analysis
3.1. Methodology and data
In order to test the validity of the outlined hypotheses on the relationship 
between (vertical and horizontal) inequality and emigration, I outline the 
operationalization of two key concepts, individual and collective relative 
deprivation, which are at the core of the following empirical analysis. 
Hereby, I refer to a standard assumption in NELM that an individual’s 
perception of relative deprivation arises from inter-personal comparisons 
of his situation with those who are perceived as better offf (Stark 2006). 
According to Yitzhaki (1979), individual relative deprivation can be defĳined 
as an aggregate shortfall of an individual’s income with regard to the respec-
tive income of all wealthier members of a society, divided by the number 
of all members of the society. Or, more technically: assuming a continuous 
income distribution with F(y) representing the cumulative distribution of 
income and 1-F(y) reflecting the percentage of individuals whose income 
is higher than y. For any individual i of the society, feelings of (personal) 
relative deprivation are then an increasing function of the percentage of 
individuals with an income larger than yi, – F(yi), times their mean excess 
income: 
RDi = ∫      [1 – F(z)]dz = [1 – F(yi)] · E(z – yi|z > yi)
ymax
yi
     (1)
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Stark (2006) shows that the total (aggregate) relative deprivation is equal to 
the total aggregate income times the Gini coefffĳ icient of income inequality 
G in a society with n members:




i =  1 
      
(2)
Given a country’s overall (vertical) inequality, measured by the Gini coef-
fĳ icient, and its average income with GDP per capita as an approximation, 
and ignoring within-group inequality, we can calculate the overall (i.e. 
ignoring group boundaries) individual relative deprivation IRD across all 
members of a society as follows:
IRDoverall = G · ȳ = ––– nTRD     (3)
Overall vertical inequality in a society can then be decomposed into two 
elements: horizontal inequality between ethnic groups generating CRD, and 
vertical inequality within ethnic groups generating IRD. 
For calculating intra-group IRD, we may assume that individual i, 
member of ethnic group k ∈K , perceives feelings of individual relative 
deprivation IRDik according to the proportion of in-group members of the 
same ethnic group k that are richer than individual k times their mean 
excess income: 
IRDik(yi) = [1 – F(yi,k)] · E(zk – yi,k|zk > yi,k)     (4)
At the same time, and given the existence of horizontal inequality, 
individual i as a member of ethnic group k may also perceive feelings of 
collective relative deprivation CRDik. CRD can be defĳined as the mean excess 
income of all non-members of ethnic group k belonging to another ethnic 
group l which has an average income
 
ȳl higher than the per capita income 
of members of group k, ȳl:
CRDik(ȳi,k) = ∫      [1 – F(z)]dz = [1 – F(ȳi,k)] · E(z – ȳk|z > ȳi,k)ȳk
ȳl
max
      (5)
This defĳ inition implies that collective relative deprivation is equally per-
ceived by all members of the same group.
In most countries, vertical inequality is positively associated with hori-
zontal inequality. It is sometimes possible however, to have considerable 
inter-group inequality combined with rather low within group inequality, or 
vice versa. In countries where horizontal inequality forms a salient compo-
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nent of the overall inequality, any ambition to reduce overall inequality may 
be bound to fail without reducing inequality between groups (Stewart 2002). 
But typically the between group component of overall (vertical) inequality is 
relatively small compared to within group inequality (cf. Stewart et al. 2005). 
In order to quantify CRD, Cederman et al. (2011) provide a new global 
dataset on economic horizontal inequality across ethnic groups by provid-
ing estimates on per capita income by ethnic group. These data have been 
generated by combining Nordhaus’ (2006) G-Econ dataset on local economic 
activity with information on settlement areas of ethnic groups (Cederman 
et al. 2010).7 
Based on this data on the mean income for each major ethnic group, I 
am able to calculate measures for countries’ CRD (per capita) according to 
Eq (5). In order to calculate a country’s average intra-group IRD, i.e. relative 
deprivation within ethnic groups, I fĳ irst need to calculate a country’s per 
capita inter-group IRD (vertical income inequality)  according to Eq (3) for 
which we use the 1990s ten-year average on each country’s Gini coefffĳ icient 
(World Bank 2012). Based on this measure of a country’s overall vertical 
inequality (IRDoverall) per capita, we can determine a country’s average level 
of intra-group IRD, i.e. relative deprivation within ethnic groups, by the 
diffference between the per capita IRDoverall and the average inter-group 
CRD. According to our two hypotheses, we expect a positive association 
between emigration flows and intra-group IRD, and a negative efffect for 
intra-group CRD. 
As further control variables we use each country’s standardized 
geographical size as calculated by the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales (Mayer and Zignago 2006). The usefulness 
of this variable is justifĳied by the fact that larger countries usually have more 
internal opportunities for potential migrants, which make international 
emigration a less needed, and thus, less aspired option (de Haas 2010). 
As already mentioned, the migration literature has shown that it is not 
generally the poorest people who migrate internationally as economic 
constraints and limited access to human and knowledge capital are central 
prerequisites for realising emigration aspirations (Czaika and de Haas 2012). 
We control for the efffect of limited capabilities for migration by considering 
two alternative proxies capturing access and availability of human and 
economic resources. A fĳ irst, standard proxy for resource constraints or 
afff luence is people’s income (GDP per capita). However, in the way we 
have operationalized our horizontal and vertical income inequality, we 
may run into problems of co-linearity between average income levels and 
our measures of relative deprivation. In fact, intra-group IRD as well as 
109 
 ARE UNEQUAL SOCIETIES MORE MIGRATORY?
CZAIK A
inter-group CRD are signifĳicantly correlated with income per capita (around 
0.8). That is why the income variable has been replaced by using information 
on UNDP’s human development index (HDI) by averaging for each country 
(all available) HDI scores during the 1990 (UNDP 2012). Herewith, we try to 
capture not only economic, but also education and health aspects reflecting 
a broader defĳ inition of human capabilities. We are expecting that this 
measure approximates average migration capabilities, and is thus positively 
associated with overall emigration intensity.
Furthermore, we control for the quality of the political and institutional 
environments (political violence) using information based on the Political 
Terror Scale (www.politicalterrorscale.org), which captures levels of political 
violence and terror that a country experiences ranging from: ‘Countries 
under a secure rule of law’ (level 1), to ‘Terror has expanded to the whole 
population’ (level 5) (see Gibney et al 2011). What we are expecting is that 
political terror and instability is positively associated with people’s desire 
to leave the country.8 
The dependent variable(s) are based on emigrant stock data disaggregated 
by migrants’ skill levels (Docquier & Marfouk 2006). This dataset contains 
information for 192 independent countries on the number of emigrants 
at working-age (25 and over) and categorised by their educational attain-
ment (low, medium, high skilled) who have migrated to an OECD country 
before 2000. Docquier and Marfouk (2006) have re-calculated emigrant 
stocks based on information on the composition of OECD immigration 
stocks, which capture about 90 per cent of the worldwide stocks of highly 
skilled migrants. Obviously, coverage for medium and low skill migrants 
is signifĳ icantly lower and estimates have to be interpreted accordingly. In 
general, and as long as skills transferability is not a major problem, highly 
skill workers have a higher propensity to migrate internationally than 
lower skilled people, which implies that –on average- emigration rates are 
increasing with skill levels. 
Finally, emigration decisions of diffferent skill groups are unlikely to 
be mutually independent. For instance, large-scale emigration can reduce 
grievances among those who stay if, for example, emigration of skilled 
workers creates new opportunities for social mobility for those left behind 
(Pfafff & Kim 2003). My empirical strategy will take this into account by 
simultaneously estimating three migration equations for high, medium, and 
low skilled migrants, respectively. This means that the error term for the ith 
equation is correlated with the error terms of the other two other equations. 
Furthermore, our measures capturing horizontal and vertical inequality, 
respectively, may be endogenous either due to reverse causality or an omit-
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ted variable bias. In order to minimise this bias I am using per capita rent 
of natural resources an instrumental variable. We simultaneously estimate 
the three equations with a SUR (seemingly unrelated regression) estimator, 
and as a robustness check, also with a 3SLS estimator.9 
3.2. Results
Before providing some preliminary evidence on the type of associations 
between horizontal and vertical inequality, respectively, on a country’s 
emigration propensity, Figure 1 displays log-linear relationships between 
skill-based emigration rates and Gini coefffĳicients for 146 countries in 2000.10 
Skill-specifĳ ic emigration rates (logged) plotted against countries’ Gini 
coefffĳ icients displays the following: (1) emigration rates for high skilled 
workers are systematically higher than those for medium and low skill 
workers; (2) emigration rates of high skilled people are higher in societies 
with high inequality; and (3) low skilled people are less migratory in more 
unequal societies. Interestingly, these results seem to partly contradict 
Borjas’ (1987) predictions regarding the link between income inequality 
and migration. Regarding the efffects of the skill and income distribution 
in the home country on emigration propensities for various skill groups, 
the Borjas model implies that ceteris paribus the more unequal returns on 
skills (e.g. in terms of wage rates or income per capita) are distributed the 
more similar are emigration rates across diffferent skill groups. This implies 
that societies with a relatively equal income distribution should expect a 
relatively strong positive selection of highly skilled migrants compared to 
more unequal societies for which we should expect a more balanced or even 
negative selection of migrants along skill levels.
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Figure 1 Inequality and skilled-based emigration (N=146)
Figure 1 implicitly shows that the Gini coefffĳ icient as a measure of overall 
vertical inequality is –if at all– rather negatively correlated with total (i.e. 
independent from skill) emigration rates. This contradicts the theoretical 
rationale proposed by scholars such as Stark (2006) and also some empirical 
evidence provided by Liebig-Souza (2004) and others, who suggest that 
more unequal societies (measured by the Gini coefffĳ icient) are expected 
to experience higher emigration rates, mainly due to a higher level of total 
relative deprivation. However, an ‘overall measure’ such as a countries’ 
Gini coefffĳ icient ignores the existence of structural inequality and patterns 
of ‘double relative deprivation’, which take implications of horizontal and 
vertical inequalities into account. 
Therefore, what matters is not only whether emigration responds to an 
unequal income distribution in a country, but more importantly, whether 
within and between group inequalities afffect emigration propensities in 
opposite directions and varying degrees for diffferent skill groups. Social 
stratifĳ ication, such as ethnic fractionalization, in combination with rela-
tively strong personal or social identities and respective feelings of relative 
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Table 1 Emigration by skill level: Horizontal versus vertical inequality, 2000, SUR
DV: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Emigrants (log) 
by Skill
High Medium Low High Medium Low
High skilled pop (log) 0.418** 0.416**
(0.060) (0.061)
Med skilled pop (log) 0.282** 0.290**
(0.070) (0.071)
Low skilled pop (log) 0.208* 0.209*
(0.087) (0.086)
Human development (log) 1.140* 3.431** 2.214** 1.690** 4.053** 2.710**
(0.560) (0.527) (0.703) (0.524) (0.453) (0.628)
Country size (log) -0.258+ -0.253+ -0.198 -0.135 -0.084 -0.017
(0.136) (0.150) (0.181) (0.137) (0.151) (0.178)
Political violence 0.449** 0.508** 0.502** 0.285** 0.317* 0.365*
(0.121) (0.142) (0.166) (0.109) (0.127) (0.147)
Landlocked -0.732** -0.783** -1.038** -0.976** -1.040** -1.286**
(0.225) (0.261) (0.307) (0.227) (0.261) (0.304)
Vertical inequality 0.088* 0.097* 0.059
(intra-group RD) (0.043) (0.049) (0.058)
Horizontal inequality -0.415+ -0.676* -0.896**
(inter-group RD) (0.240) (0.275) (0.321)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 109 109 109 116 116 116
R-squared 0.68 0.60 0.47 0.65 0.57 0.45
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Signifĳicance levels: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Robustness test 
in appendix: OLS versus 3SLS (Instrument: Total natural resources rents per capita).
Table 1 provides some evidence on the direction and extent that horizontal 
and vertical inequalities are associated with emigration propensities of 
diffferent skill groups. Estimates for intra-group relative deprivation show 
that vertical inequality within ethnic groups is positively correlated with 
emigration. Interestingly though, only high and medium skilled people, 
i.e. the more privileged population, are signifĳ icantly inclined to leave the 
country if exposed to intra-group inequality. On the other hand, for all three 
skill groups, horizontal inequality seems negatively associated with emigra-
tion tendencies. Thus, inequality across ethnic groups has the opposite 
efffect compared to inequality within ethnic groups. Therefore, feelings 
of collective relative deprivation may work as the behavioural link that 
turns structural inter-group inequalities into an emigration barrier due to 
stronger loyalty to their ethnic group. Our estimates show that this ‘loyalty 
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efffect’ seems particularly strong for lower skilled people whose estimate 
(-0.896) is more than double the size of the estimate for high skilled people 
(-0.415). Due to higher opportunity costs, i.e. costs for not leaving are higher 
for high-skilled than for low-skilled people, better educated people seem 
less concerned about and afffected by structural inequalities across ethnic 
groups than lower skilled people. Therefore, when faced either with vertical 
or horizontal inequality, high-skilled people are generally more inclined 
than the low-skilled population to choose the exit option. 
Our other control variables largely show the expected signs. Emigration 
rates are increasing by skill level, and average human development is posi-
tively associated with overall emigration. Interestingly, this relationship is 
non-linear in skill levels indicating that medium skilled people are becoming 
more migratory as a consequence of development than high- or low-skilled 
people. Beyond this, political environment is a robust driver of emigration 
for all three skill groups, whereas landlocked countries experience less 
emigration than countries with sea access. Furthermore, there is a weak 
negative correlation between country size and emigration, which reflects 
the fact that larger countries are generally less (internationally) migratory 
because of available internal opportunities, which makes international 
migration a less attractive option.11 
4. Conclusion
Are unequal societies more migratory? The (preliminary) answer is: not 
necessarily, it depends on the type of inequality. 
In fractionalized societies, we usually observe inequality within (i.e. 
vertical) and across (i.e. horizontal) social groups. This distinction has often 
been ignored in investigations of the inequality-migration nexus. However, 
this distinction is important, because people may respond diffferently to 
these two types of inequality. In this paper, I have argued that people 
perceive within-group inequality in terms of feelings of individual relative 
deprivation, whereas between-group inequality is generating feelings of 
collective relative deprivation. 
Stark (2006) and others suggest that societies with higher income inequal-
ity are also characterised by higher migration propensities. However, simple 
cross-sectional regression analysis on emigration stocks for more than 140 
sending countries does not confĳ irm this hypothesis. Overall inequality 
measured by the Gini coefffĳ icient is positively associated with high-skilled 
emigration and negatively with low-skilled emigration. These somehow 
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opposing ‘efffects’ are resolved when we use – in my view – more appropriate 
concepts of vertical and horizontal inequality, which I operationalize by 
calculating average levels of individual and collective relative depriva-
tion. This shows that emigration propensities are more consistent across 
skill groups when regressed on these measures of vertical and horizontal 
inequality. People of all skill levels (and thus, potentially all income levels) 
emigrate more from countries with relatively high vertical intra-group 
inequality. This type of inequality is supposed to generate aspirations for 
personal change and advancement, for which migration is a viable option. 
On the other hand, people migrate less from countries with relatively high 
horizontal inter-group inequality. 
Interestingly, while the direction of these inequality-migration rela-
tionships is quite consistent for diffferent skill groups, the size of these 
associations ref lect some skill-specifĳ ic patterns. While highly skilled 
people respond much stronger to vertical inequality within ethnic groups, 
low-skilled people are signifĳ icantly more responsive to more structural 
horizontal inequalities across ethnic groups. This seems to confĳirm other 
research that is showing that better education and capabilities spur aspira-
tions for personal advancement, for which, of course, emigration is one 
possible behavioural instrument. Better education makes people more 
aware and receptive to outside opportunities, and also more able to realise 
these opportunities by leaving the country. Poorer and often lower skilled 
people do not have access to the same set and quality of opportunities, 
which is why they may be more inclined to be loyal and interested in the 
fate of their own ethnic group.
In this study, the only marker of social identity is people’s ethnicity. In a 
context of multi-identities, of course, this is a reductionist approach and its 
only justifĳication is data availability. For future (case) studies it would there-
fore be interesting to see whether inequality within and across other social 
identities such as religion, language, class, and so on have slightly diffferent 
efffects on migration behaviour. Compared to other social categories, ethnic 
boundaries are generally assumed as relatively impermeable, and therefore, 
able to create a relatively strong element of group identifĳication. Thus, we 
would expect that ceteris paribus horizontal inequality across ethnic groups 
has a stronger migration-reducing efffect than the same type of inequality for 
other social categories. Obviously, beyond ethnic or any other type of social 
identity, factors such as a strong national identity can be the ‘glue’ that holds 
a society together, and thus, reducing emigration propensities. 
Finally, the reverse impact of massive brain drain on inequality in the 
sending country for example, has been beyond the scope of this paper. 
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However, it is very likely that emigration of educated and more privileged 
people may afffect vertical as well as more structural horizontal inequality. 
Depending on whether better educated emigrants are providing opportu-
nities for upward social mobility of relatively deprived or consolidating 
social inequalities through their fĳ inancial or social remittances, emigration 
can either be part of the problem or the solution in overcoming systemic 
inequality. Empirical evidence on the efffect of emigration on horizontal and 
vertical inequality is not available yet, and therefore conclusive propositions 
on possible emigration-induced reverse efffects on vertical and horizontal 
inequality are rather speculative. 
Possible next steps in gaining a better understanding of the inter-linkages 
between social fractionalisation, relative deprivation and migration should 
elaborate more on the role of social identity and attitudes on perceptions 
of relative deprivation, but also whether and under what circumstances 
emigration is a strategy to overcome feelings of relative deprivation. For 
this purpose, more micro-level and case study evidence is needed in order 
to explore, for instance, whether diffferent types of relative deprivation 
produce diffferent types of migrants, or whether ‘individual migration’ is 
really linked to feelings of personal relative deprivation whereas ‘collective 
migration’ may rather result when an entire social group perceives some 
sense of collective relative deprivation. 
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Notes
1. In fact, Czaika (2012) provides some mixed evidence for India indicating that individual 
relative deprivation of households increases propensity for internal migration, whereas the 
efffect on international emigration is rather weakly negative.
2. The same holds true for the role of IRD in migrants’ decision about staying or returning 
home. As long as transnational ties remain strong, migrants main reference group is likely 
to be the origin community. This explains why many migrants are willing to accept low-paid 
3D jobs (dangerous, dirty and demeaning) that natives typically refuse. Although income 
earned by international migrants in low-skilled and often irregular jobs in construction, 
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agriculture, industry or domestic work is low by Western standards, it is often many times 
what migrants would have been able to earn in origin countries, substantially raising their 
socio-economic status in origin communities (cf. McKenzie & Gibson, 2010).
3. Tajfel defĳ ines a social group on the basis of criteria which are either external or internal. 
External criteria are ‘outside’ designations or characteristics, whereas internal criteria are 
related to group identifĳ ication.
4. Obviously, a third alternative is inaction where (relatively deprived) members of a disad-
vantaged group do nothing to improve their personal or collective situation.
5. Highly skilled migrants, who are the comparatively wealthier migrants, and thus, less 
relatively deprived within their group of reference in the fĳ irst place, may (1) compare with 
peers outside their ethnic reference group; and (2) integrate more quickly and easily to the 
host country context, and thus, will quickly substitute their original ethnically-based point 
of reference by a new peer group in the host country (e.g. expats), which most likely afffects 
the return decision more than the actual emigration decision. In the long run, though, 
reference group substitution is also likely to occur also for lower skilled and culturally more 
distinct migrants, which explains why the second generation often refuses to do the jobs 
their parents would have accepted (Czaika & de Haas 2012). 
6. Apart from the loyalty efffect, collective action for voice, which implies non-migration, is also 
more likely if the exit option is relatively costly. Exit costs generally depend on various kinds 
of economic resources, political constraints and social capital, but also on the availability 
and transferability of human capital. For instance, less educated people face usually higher 
barriers in transferring their skills and qualifĳ ications to another country. 
7. The G-Econ dataset assembles data on local economic activity within countries for geo-
graphical one degree grid cells, and convert these to comparable GDP fĳ igures in purchasing 
power parity. The data are constructed from a variety of sources, including regional gross 
product data for the lowest available political subdivision, estimates of regional income 
by industry, and estimates of rural population and agricultural income. The specifĳ ic 
methodologies difffer by countries and data availability (see Nordhaus (2006) for a detailed 
discussion). The database covers about 160 countries, but the temporal scope is limited to 
observations in 1990.
8. As an alternative measure that would capture the quality of the political climate and 
environment we considered and tested variables from FreedomHouse (2009) on political 
and civil rights. In the end, we have decided for the political terror scale variable because it 
performed better, but results based on the political and civil rights variable can be obtained 
from the author on request.
9. 3SLS results (additional to OLS) results are reported in the appendix.
10. Find the list of countries including Gini coefffĳ icients in the appendix (Table A1).
11. The results of the 3SLS (three-stage least square) regression are reported in the appendix 
(Tables A4 and A5). The respective results largely confĳ irm the results of the SUR regression 
(Table 1). 
References
Bhandari, P. (2004). Relative deprivation and migration in an agricultural setting of Nepal. 
Population & Environment, 25(5), 475-499. 
Borjas, G.J. (1987). Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants, American Economic Review, 
77(4), 531-53.
117 
 ARE UNEQUAL SOCIETIES MORE MIGRATORY?
CZAIK A
Brewer, M.B. (1991). The social self. On being the same and diffferent at the same time. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 475-82.
Brown, R. (2000). Group Processes: Dynamics Within and Between Groups. Oxford: Blackwell.
Cederman, L.-E., Weidmann, N.B., & Gleditsch, K.S. (2011). Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-
Nationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison. American Political Science Review, 105(3), 478-95.
Cederman, L.-E., Wimmer, A., & Min, B. (2010). Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and 
Analysis. World Politics, 62(1), 87-119.
CEPII (2012) GeoDist. Retrieved in January 2013 from http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/welcome.asp
Czaika, M. (2012). Internal versus international migration and the role of multiple deprivation: 
some evidence from India, Asian Population Studies, 8(2), 125-149. 
Czaika, M., & de Haas, H. (2012). The Role of Internal and International Relative Deprivation in 
Global Migration. Oxford Development Studies, 40(4), 423-442. 
Czaika, M., & Vothknecht, M. (2012). Migration as cause and consequence of aspirations, IMI 
Working Paper, No. 57, University of Oxford.
De Haas, H. (2010). Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective. International Migra-
tion Review, 44(1), 227-264. 
Docquier, F., & Marfouk, A. (2006) International Migration, Remittances and Development, In: 
C. Ozden and M. Schifff (eds), Palgrave Macmillan: New York.
Ellemers, N., van Knippenberg, A., & Wilke, H. (1990). The influence of permeability of group 
boundaries and stability of group status on strategies of individual mobility and social 
change. British Journal of Social Psychology, 29(3), 233-246. 
Freedomhouse. (2009). Freedom in the World. FreedomHouse: Washington, DC. Retrieved in 
Januray 2013 from www.freedomhouse.org. 
Gibney, M., Cornett, L., & Wood, R., (2011) Political Terror Scale 1976-2008. Retrieved in January 
2013 from the PTS website: www.politicalterrorscale.org/
Gurr, T. R. (1993). Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethno-political Conflicts, Washington DC: 
Institute of Peace Press.
Hirschman, A.O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, 
and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Horowitz, D.L. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kawakami, K., & Dion, K. L. (1993). The impact of salient self-identities on relative deprivation 
and action intentions. European Journal of Social Psychology, 23(5), 525-540.
Liebig, T.,& Sousa-Poza, A. (2004). Migration, self-selection and income inequality: an interna-
tional analysis, Kyklos, 57(1), 125-146.
Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (1993). Theories 
of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal. Population and Development Review, 
19(3), 431-466. 
Mayda, A. (2009). International migration: a panel data analysis of the determinants of bilateral 
f lows. Journal of Population Economics, 23(4), 1249-1274. 
Mayer, T., & Zignago, X. (2006). Notes on CEPII’s distances measures. www.cepii.fr/distance/
noticedist_en.pdf.
McKenzie, D. & Gibson, J. (2010) The Development Impact of a Best Practice Seasonal Worker 
Policy, Washington, DC: World Bank.
Nordhaus,W.D. (2006). Geography and Macroeconomics: New Data and New Findings. Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences 103 (10): 3510–17.
North, D. (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton.
Ortega, F., & Peri, G. (2013). The Efffect of Income and Immigration Policies on International 
Migration, Migration Studies, 1(1), 1-28.
118
COMPARATIVE MIGRATION STUDIES
CMS 2013, VOL. 1, NO. 1
Østby, G. (2008). Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict, Journal of 
Peace Research, 45(2), 143–162.
Østby, G. (2011). Horizontal Inequalities and Political Violence. PhD Dissertation, University of 
Oslo.
Pettigrew, T. F., Christ, O., Wagner, U., Meertens, R. W., Van Dick, R., & Zick, A. (2008). Relative 
Deprivation and Intergroup Prejudice. Journal of Social Issues, 64(2), 385-401. 
Pfafff, S., & Kim, H. (2003). Exit–Voice Dynamics in Collective Action: An Analysis of Emigration 
and Protest in the East German Revolution. American Journal of Sociology 109(2), 401–444.
Quinn, M. A. (2006). Relative deprivation, wage diffferentials and Mexican migration. Review of 
Development Economics, 10(1), 135-153. 
Runciman, W. G. (1966). Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A Study of Attitudes to Social 
Inequality in Twentieth-Century England. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Sen, A. (1992) Inequality Re-examined. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Stark, O. (1984). Rural-to-Urban Migration in LDCs: A Relative Deprivation Approach. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 32(3), 475-486. 
Stark, O. (2006). Inequality and migration: A behavioral link. Economics Letters, 91(1), 146-152. 
Stark, O., Micevska, M., & Mycielski, J. (2009). Relative poverty as a determinant of migration: 
Evidence from Poland. Economics Letters, 103(3), 119-122. 
Stark, O., & Taylor, J. E. (1989). Relative Deprivation and International Migration. Demography, 
26(1), 1-14. 
Stark, O., & Taylor, J. E. (1991). Migration Incentives, Migration Types: The Role of Relative 
Deprivation. The Economic Journal, 101(408), 1163-1178. 
Stark, O., & Yitzhaki, S. (1988). Labour Migration as a Response to Relative Deprivation. Journal 
of Population Economics, 1(1), 57-70.
Stewart, F. (2002) Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development, QEH Working 
Paper, No. 81, University of Oxford.
Stewart, F., Brown, G., & Mancini, L. (2005). Why Horizontal Inequalities Matter: Some Implica-
tions for Measurement, CRISE working paper, No. 19, University of Oxford.
Stewart, F. (ed.)(2008). Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in 
Multiethnic Societies. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annual review of psychology, 33(1), 1-39. 
Tilly, C. (1978). From Mobilization to Revolution. New York: McGraw-Hill.
UNDP (2012) Human Development Index, United Nations: New York, retrieved in January 2013 
from http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103106.html.
Vogler, M., & Rotte, R. (2000). The efffects of development on migration: theoretical issues and 
new empirical evidence. Journal of Population Economics, 13(3), 485-508. 
Walker, I., & Pettigrew, T. F. (1984). Relative deprivation theory: An overview and conceptual 
critique. British Journal of Social Psychology, 23(4), 301-310. 
Walker, I., & Mann, L. (1987). Unemployment, relative deprivation, and social protest. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 13(2), 275-283.
Walker, I., & Smith, H. J. (2000) Relative Deprivation: Specifĳication, Development, and Integration, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Wright, Stephen C. (2001) “Strategic collective action: Social psychology and social change.” 
Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Intergroup processes (2001): 409-430.
Worldbank. (2012). World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Wouterse, F. (2008) Migration, Poverty, and Inequality: Evidence from Burkina Faso, Washington, 
DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Yitzhaki, S. (1979). Relative Deprivation and the Gini Coefffĳ icient. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 93(2), 321-324.
119 
 ARE UNEQUAL SOCIETIES MORE MIGRATORY?
CZAIK A
About the author
Mathias Czaika, International Migration Institute for International Development, 
University of Oxford  
3 Mansfĳ ield Road, OX1 3TB, Oxford, United Kingdom  
Phone: +44-1865-281706, Fax: +44 (0) 1865-281801   
IMI, University of Oxford   
Email: Mathias.Czaika@qeh.ox.ac.uk
Appendix
Table A1  Gini coefficients (average 1990-2000) of N=146 sample countries
Albania (29.12); Algeria (35.33); Angola (58.64); Argentina (47.92); Armenia (40.22); Australia (35.19); Austria 
(29.15); Azerbaijan (34.96); Bangladesh (29.19); Belarus (27.32); Belgium (32.97); Belize (59.56); Benin (38.62); 
Bhutan (46.74); Bolivia (52.76); Bosnia & Herzegovina (28.03); Botswana (60.96); Brazil (58.95); Bulgaria 
(28.16); Burkina Faso (48.78); Burundi (37.86); Cambodia (38.28); Cameroon (46.82); Canada (32.56); Cape 
Verde (50.40); Central African Republic (61.33); Chad (39.78); Chile (55.34); China (41.53); Colombia (56.37); 
Comoros (64.34); Congo (47.32); DR Congo (44.43); Costa Rica (46.82); Cote d’Ivoire (39.11); Croatia (28.62); 
Czech Republic (27.43); Denmark (24.70); Djibouti (36.77); Dominican Republic (50.44); Ecuador (52.77); 
Egypt (31.63); El Salvador (51.40); Estonia (36.05); Ethiopia (34.98); Finland (26.88); France (32.74); Gabon 
(41.45); Gambia (50.23); Georgia (37.50); Germany (28.31); Ghana (39.44); Greece (34.27); Guatemala (55.31); 
Guinea (43.73); Guinea Bissau (52.00); Guyana (47.38); Haiti (59.50); Honduras (53.57); Hong Kong (43.44); 
Hungary (26.99); India (36.80); Indonesia (39.41); Iran (43.55); Ireland (34.28); Israel (39.20); Italy (36.03); 
Jamaica (40.12); Japan (24.85); Jordan (39.89); Kazakhstan (34.00); Kenya (47.35); Korea (31.59); Kyrgyzstan 
(41.43); Lao PDR (32.67); Latvia (30.98); Lesotho (60.55); Liberia (52.56); Lithuania (32.00); Macedonia (31.33); 
Madagascar (42.36); Malawi (50.31); Malaysia (48.44); Maldives (37.41); Mali (50.56); Mauritania (42.13); 
Mexico (50.47); Moldova (36.03); Mongolia (31.74); Morocco (39.33); Mozambique (44.49); Namibia (74.33); 
Nepal (37.67); Netherlands (30.90); New Zealand (36.17); Nicaragua (55.12); Niger (38.82); Nigeria (45.73); 
Norway (25.79); Pakistan (31.30); Panama (55.06); Papua New Guinea (50.88); Paraguay (57.50); Peru (45.56); 
Philippines (44.74); Poland (31.77); Portugal (38.45); Qatar (41.10); Romania (28.34); Russia (43.99); Rwanda 
(46.68); Saint Lucia (42.60); Sao Tome & Principe (50.60); Senegal (47.79); Serbia & Montenegro (32.55); Sierra 
Leone (42.52); Singapore (42.48); Slovakia (22.65); Slovenia (28.80); South Africa (57.90); Spain (34.66); Sri 
Lanka (33.95); Suriname (52.81); Swaziland (60.65); Sweden (25.00); Switzerland (33.68); Tanzania (34.23); 
Thailand (43.53); Timor Leste (39.52); Togo (34.41); Tonga (31.52); Trinidad & Tobago (40.27); Tunisia (41.24); 
Turkey (41.53); Turkmenistan (38.08); Uganda (40.94); Ukraine (29.93); United Kingdom (35.97); USA (40.81); 
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Table A2  Descriptive statistics
Variable Source Obs Mean Std. 
Dev.
Min Max
Emigrants Docquier & Marfouk 
(2006)Low Skilled 194 104195 288147 6 3096853
Medium Skilled 194 85899 211629 99 2408250
High Skilled 194 103518 201227 115 1441307
Population (25+) Docquier & Marfouk 
(2006)Low Skilled 194 4875.48 21729.19 2 271159
Medium Skilled 194 9694.76 43603.84 3 467883
High Skilled 194 1858.81 7558.79 0 94168
Income per capita (ppp) WDI (2012) 220 11687.69 12357.61 312 76403
Human Development UNDP (2012) 177   0.72 0.17 0.34 0.97
Country size CEPII (2012) 226 180.44 229.78 0.53 1554.24
Political terror (Gibney et al. 2011) 179 2.47 1.11 1 5
Landlocked CEPII (2012) 226 0.16 0.37 0 1
Inequality
Vertical (intra-group RD) Own calculation 111 3220.09 3308 160 16947.38
Horizontal (intergroup RD) Cederman et al 
(2011)
122 199.88 406 0 2736.72
Gini Worldbank(2012) 146 41.42 9.96 22.65 74.33



















Population size 0.333 1.000
HDI 0.262 0.046 1.000
Country size 0.250 0.492 -0.036 1.000
Political violence 0.059 0.167 -0.515 0.271 1.000
Political violence -0.168 -0.089 -0.277 0.047 -0.032 1.000
Vertical Inequality 
(intra-group RD)
0.231 0.058 0.764 0.186 -0.543 -0.140 1.000 
Horizontal inequality 
(inter-group RD)
0.130 0.018 0.264 0.297 0.063 -0.202 0.221 
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Table A4 Vertical inequality and migration (OLS vs 3SLS)
DV: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Emigrants (log) by 
Skill
High Medium Low High Medium Low
Estimator OLS OLS OLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS
High skilled pop (log) 0.699** 0.489**
(0.085) (0.076)
Med skilled pop (log) 0.759** 0.049
(0.101) (0.085)
Low skilled pop (log) 0.587** -0.233
(0.110) (0.147)
Human development (log) -0.397 3.039** 0.752 -3.037 -8.472+ -10.765
(0.663) (0.548) (0.768) (2.708) (4.627) (7.871)
Country size (log) -0.574** -0.676** -0.557** -0.780* -1.458** -1.495
(0.156) (0.167) (0.197) (0.326) (0.562) (0.971)
Political violence 0.348** 0.257+ 0.345* 1.201* 3.111** 3.696*
(0.127) (0.152) (0.174) (0.603) (0.973) (1.658)
Landlocked -0.698** -0.624* -0.970** -0.105 1.113 1.278
(0.233) (0.271) (0.318) (0.511) (0.842) (1.451)
Vertical inequality 0.080+ 0.086+ 0.053 0.690 2.029** 2.406+
(intra-group RD) (0.044) (0.051) (0.060) (0.453) (0.733) (1.254)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.71 0.68 0.53 0.17 -4.08 -6.81
Hausman test (prob>chi2) . . . 0.182 0.182 0.182
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Additional instrument: Total 
natural resources rents per capita.
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Table A5 Horizontal inequality and migration (OLS vs 3SLS)
DV: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Emigrants (log) by 
Skill
High Medium Low High Medium Low
Estimator OLS OLS OLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS
High skilled pop (log) 0.718** 0.340**
(0.088) (0.060)
Med skilled pop (log) 0.803** 0.170*
(0.103) (0.072)
Low skilled pop (log) 0.615** 0.017
(0.112) (0.097)
Human development (log) -0.053 3.506** 1.073 2.946** 5.387** 4.955**
(0.649) (0.474) (0.705) (0.647) (0.615) (0.893)
Country size (log) -0.483** -0.582** -0.412* 0.166 0.347+ 0.552*
(0.158) (0.171) (0.196) (0.171) (0.194) (0.250)
Political violence 0.188 0.074 0.210 0.388** 0.488** 0.578**
(0.114) (0.135) (0.154) (0.127) (0.149) (0.191)
Landlocked -0.935** -0.820** -1.213** -1.193** -1.394** -1.690**
(0.235) (0.271) (0.314) (0.268) (0.311) (0.402)
Horizontal inequality -0.343 -0.479+ -0.821* -2.222** -3.352** -4.138**
(inter-group RD) (0.248) (0.285) (0.332) (0.662) (0.770) (0.988)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116
R-squared 0.68 0.65 0.51 0.48 0.25 -0.04
Hausman test (prob>chi2) . . . 0.001 0.001 0.001
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Additional instrument: Total 
natural resources rents per capita.
 2013 Czaika / Amsterdam University Press. 
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